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Abstract 
 
The following chapter critically surveys the attendant benefits and drawbacks of asset securitisation 
on both financial institutions and firms. It also elicits salient lessons to be learned about the 
securitisation of SME-related obligations from a cursory review of SME securitisation in Germany as 
a foray of asset securitisation in a bank-centred financial system paired with a strong presence of 
SMEs in industrial production. 
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“Just as the electronics industry was formed when the vacuum tubes were replaced by transistors, 
and transistors were then replaced by integrated circuits, the financial services industry is being 
transformed now that securitised credit is beginning to replace traditional lending. Like other 
technological transformations, this one will take place over the years, not overnight. We estimate it 
will take 10 to 15 years for structured securitised credit to replace to displace completely the classical 
lending system – not a long time, considering that the fundamentals of banking have remained 
essentially unchanged since the Middle Ages.” 
Lowell L. Bryan1 
 
1  Objective 
 
Although many financial institutions, large corporates, quasi-government agencies and even local 
governments and municipalities have recently begun to issue securitised debt on diverse asset classes, 
the securitisation paradigm has been largely confined to liquid asset types, which relegated the 
securitisation of SME-related payment obligations to sporadic captive finance transactions. However, 
in countries, whose industrial foundation is made up in large part by SMEs, such as Germany, asset 
securitisation would offer an interesting funding alternative to traditional channels of external finance 
captive to a pernicious bank-based financial system. 
 
The following paper acknowledges the topical nature of asset securitisation and probes the impact of 
attendant benefits and drawbacks on the refinancing decision of financial institutions and firms. It 
also elicits salient lessons to be learned about the securitisation of SME-related obligations from a 
cursory review of SME securitisation in Germany as pars pro toto of asset securitisation in a bank-
centred financial system paired with a strong presence of SMEs in industrial production. The utility 
of this instructive yet succinct exercise is to set the stage for a comprehensive and purposeful debate 
about use of securitised debt as an alternative refinancing mechanism regardless of issuer size and 
financial system. The paper is structured as follows. After a brief definition of asset-backed 
securitisation (ABS) we describe the key benefits and investment risks associated with asset 
securitisation in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 specially focuses on the securitisation of SME-related 
claims, such as SME loans held by banks or trade receivables owed to SMEs. Section 6 provides a 
synopsis of the German approach to SME securitisation. Section 7 concludes.    3 
 
2  Definition of asset securitisation 
 
2.1  The motivation of securitisation 
 
Asset securitisation is a structured finance technique that allows for credit to be provided directly to 
market processes rather than through financial intermediaries. By engaging in securitisation issuers 
actively sponsor the commoditisation of asset risk through disintermediated debt refinancing, where 
capital markets channel funds to efficient uses of economic activity. In principal, securitisation serves 
as a refinancing mechanism to diversify external sources of asset funding and to transfer specific risk 
exposures. Conceptually, asset securitisation converts regular and classifiable cash flows from a 
diversified portfolio of illiquid present or future receivables (liquidity transformation and asset 
diversification process) of varying maturity and quality (integration and differentiation process) into negotiable 
capital market paper (“tranches”) issued by either the originator of the securitised assets/receivables 
or a non-recourse, single-asset finance company (“special-purpose vehicle” (SPV)). So these tranches 
are contingent claims on a designated portfolio of securitsed assets, which can be “divided into 
different slices of risk to appeal to a range of investors” (Wighton, 2005).2 They come in two broad 
classes of securities: debt-like (secured) notes and equity. Whilst the holders of debt-like notes 
establish prior claim to the underlying reference portfolio of loans in order of agreed seniority, 
issuers and/or asset originators frequently retain a residual equity-like class as illiquid first loss 
position, required by rating agencies as bad debt provision for expected loss. Issued debt securities 
differ in seniority and risk exposure (“stratified positions”), whose subordination creates leveraged 
investment on the performance of securitised assets (“reference portfolio”). Both investment return 
(principal and interest repayment) and losses associated with the underlying reference portfolio are 
allocated among the various tranches through prioritised contractual repartitioning according to 
subordination (Telpner, 2003). This risk sharing mechanism sustains a fine-tuned security design of 
customised debt securities with optimal mean-variance properties. Hence, issuers of asset-backed 
securities improve overall market efficiency3 by offering marketable financial claims on securitised 
asset exposures at merchantable quality (Kendall, 1996). From a broader economic perspective, the 
evolution of efficient securitisation markets has served to mitigate disparities in the availability and 
cost of credit in primary lending markets by linking singular credit facilities to the aggregate pricing 
and valuation discipline of the capital markets. Debt securities issued in securitisation transactions 
generally feature lower levels of investment risk than the original credit risk of underlying securitised 
exposures, mainly because securitised debt benefits from diversification and a variety of incorporated 
security mechanisms against credit and liquidity risk. Issuers have a wide range of support    4 
mechanisms at their disposal to improve the quality of securitised assets to the extent that they 
warrant a selling price beyond what would be deemed necessary to offset attendant costs of 
managing the transaction. For instance, potential timing mismatch between repayment from the 
securitised (reference assets) and investor payout to issued debt securities requires tight interest and 
cash flow management. Commonly liquidity facilities are set aside in the form of back-up lines to 
cover liquidity shortfalls and to guarantee the full refinancing of a SPV as issuing agent. Even more 
importantly the external rating assessment of securitisation transactions strongly hinges on visible 
signs of credit risk protection. In many cases of issuers resort to (i) over-collateralisation by 
transferring credit risk at a cash discount, (ii) implicit guarantees through the cash flow structure 
and/or (iii) external third-party guarantees in order to provide credit enhancement to investors in issued 
debt securities.  
 
From an issuer perspective, securitisation registers as an alternative source of funds for profitable 
economic activity at most resourceful factor input and efficient cost of capital, which is reflected one 
or more of the following key motivations: 
 
(i)  to curtail balance sheet growth and realise certain accounting objectives and balance sheet 
patterns,  
(ii)  to reduce economic cost of capital as a proportion of asset exposure associated with asset 
funding, 
(iii)  to ease regulatory capital requirements (by lower bad debt provisions) in order to manage risk 
more efficiently, 
(iv)  to efficiently access capital markets in lieu of intermediated debt finance at a cost of 
capital, which would not be possible on account of the issuer’s own credit rating, and 
(v)  to overcome agency costs of asymmetric information in external finance (e.g. 
“underinvestment” and “asset substitution”). 
 
While the last two aspects are particularly pertinent to corporate issuers, the first three arguments are 
more related to the refinancing advantages enjoyed by financial institutions, where asset securitisation 
serves as a powerful capital management tool. Depending on the relative importance of these 
objectives issuers engage in either traditional/true sale or synthetic securitisation. In a true sale transaction 
structure the originator sheds the asset risk associated with a selected pool of on-balance sheet 
exposures by selling them to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) (“conduit”),4 which takes legal title to 
the assets. Such single-purpose securitisation conduits are completely remote from the asset 
originator in terms of economic and legal recourse (“bankruptcy-proof”) (Sullivan, 1998). The SPV    5 
collateralises the purchased asset portfolio and refinances itself by issuing multiple classes of asset-
backed securities (and equity) with different degrees of risk to capital market investors. By unloading 
credits off their books, loan originators reduce their economic (and regulatory) capital charge, and, at 
the same time, may use liquid funds from the proceeds of the true sale to refinance future lending 
activity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The securitisation process. 
 
Special purpose vehicles may also support synthetic transactions,5 where issuers create generic debt 
securities, so-called credit-linked notes (CLN), out of derivative structured claims on securitised 
assets to reduce economic cost of capital and raise cash from borrowing against existing assets and 
receivables.6,7 Synthetic transactions only transfer unwanted risk exposure of a specifically defined 
asset pool without placing assets under the control of investors through a transfer of legal title. This 
mechanism also allows (asset) originators themselves to securitise assets through derivative 
transactions without a SPV as underwriting agent. 
 
Based on this expository definition of asset-backed securitisation, let us now survey the economic 
benefits and risks of asset securitisation. 
 
3  Key benefits of asset securitisation 
 
The economic reasoning of securitisation hinges on the ability of issuers as profitable enterprises to 
maximise shareholder value as the principal goal of economic activity. Management decisions 
evaluate the economic impact of competing strategic and operational objectives on shareholder 
value. Financial activities within business entities have to be geared to support the realisation of 
profitable objectives to what capital markets deem as attainable levels of economic efficiency. 
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Securitisation confers upon issuers mainly financial advantages related to more competitive capital 
management through efficient asset funding. Further objectives of securitisation might also include 
active balance sheet restructuring, market-oriented risk management of credit risk and diversified 
liquidity (Bär, 1997 and 1998). Hence, from a capital market perspective, it is imperative to assess 
how these aspects of securitisation affect the (shareholder) value of the issuer and whether the trade-
off between envisaged benefits and attendant drawbacks yields positive payoffs to both issuers and 
investors. 
 
3.1  Risk management, private information and capital structure choice 
 
Risk Management is a transmission and control mechanism, which encapsulates different approaches 
by firms choose between the risk-return profiles of alternative (investment) strategies to maximise 
shareholder value. Asset securitisation is one operational means of risk management, which allows 
issuers to reallocate, commoditise and transfer different types of risks (e.g. credit risk, interest rate 
risk, liquidity risk or pricing risk) to capital market investors in return for some fair market price. 
While banks and other financial institutions view securitisation as an expedient means to evade 
inconsistent regulatory capital charges for credit exposures of similar risk (“optimisation of regulatory 
capital”), non-financial entities would employ securitisation primarily for the liquidity management of 
existing trade receivables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Risk characteristics of corporate loan and SME loan portfolios (Jobst, 2003a). 
 
Although there is not a single theory for the economic tenet of loan securitisation, several 
motivations might explain the issuance of securitised debt from a corporate finance perspective: (i) 
private information as a means to mitigate the regulatory capital charge and achieve greater 
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specialisation in areas of comparative advantage, (ii) avoidance of asset substitution and 
underinvestment, and (iii) reduction of the agency cost from asymmetric information in asset 
funding. 
 
According to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) private information about the originated assets would 
induce financial institutions to prefer the securitisation of better quality assets to mitigate their 
regulatory capital requirement for “overcharged” asset exposures, whilst worse quality assets are 
retained. For this selective bias to be economically sustainable issuers must extract positive payoffs 
from trading off the benefits from securitising low-risk reference portfolios against increased 
bankruptcy risk. Private information might also find an outlet in securitisation if issuers aim to 
achieve greater specialisation in sourcing and monitoring as areas of comparative advantage (Berger 
and Udell, 1993). For instance, private economic rents from bank lending explain the prominence of 
asset securitisation as a risk management tool. Especially, informational rents from SME lending in 
heavily bank-centred financial systems and the rather unfavourable rating grade distribution of typical 
SME loan portfolios (see Fig. 2 below) make loan securitisation a perfect candidate for efficient risk 
management. 
 
Asset securitisation might also redress conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders in the 
capital structure choice of firms concerning possible agency costs from “underinvestment” (Myers, 
1977 and 1984) and “asset substitution” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) due to excessive levels of debt 
or the presence of non-value maximising investment behaviour respectively. James (1988) as well as 
Benveniste and Berger (1987) show that securitisation tranches resemble secured debt, whose agency 
costs may be lower than for unsecured debt (Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Berkovitch and Kim, 1990). 
Similar to secured debt, securitisation allows issuers to appropriate partial debtholder wealth by 
carving out a defined pool of assets to satisfy securitised debt claims, which do not capture gains 
from the firm’s future investments. This prioritisation of debtor claims potentially alleviates 
underinvestment and renders existing debt less inhibitive on the realisation of new investment 
opportunities. Nonetheless, the securitised debt could possibly expropriate claimholder wealth if the 
proceeds from securitisation misallocated without disciplinary power by claimholders (Lockwood et 
al., 1996; Lang et al., 1995; Pennacchi, 1988). Consistent with conventional thinking about the capital 
structure choice issuers with high agency costs of debt and/or low growth prospects should be more 
likely to engage in asset securitisation.  
 
We also need to investigate the effects of asset securitisation on the capital structure decision as a 
funding choice under asymmetric information. Under the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984)    8 
issuers with severe information asymmetry problems would prefer to issue secured debt (i.e. asset-
backed), which carries lower agency cost, because investors receive their repayment directly from a 
diversified pool of asset exposures insulated from the issuer (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). The 
trade-off theory would restrict this choice only to cases where the marginal benefit of debt outweighs 
the associated amount of agency and financial distress cost. Hence, under the pecking order and 
trade-off theory asset securitisation is the refinancing instrument of choice for cash-strapped issuers, 
whose high agency costs of asymmetric information debar them from other forms of external 
finance. 
 
3.2  Equity return, imputed cost of equity and economic risk transfer 
 
The analysis of the benefits associated with asset securitisation as a funding alternative to traditional 
on-balance sheet debt finance also needs to consider the role of equity in the capital structure of 
issuers. The assessment of securitisation on the basis of the cost of debt alone essentially ignores 
what could be viewed as a conscious capital structure decision of “leverage in disguise.” In the 
following section we examine the leverage effect of securitisation on the return on equity and the 
imputed (calculative) cost of equity (“capital coverage”) (Röchling, 2002; Bär, 1998) for a true sale structure, 
which by definition changes the balance sheet composition of the asset originator.8 We illustrate the 
effect of asset securitisation on both economic cost of capital and the imputed cost of equity. First, 
we specify the total cost of funding as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)9 
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where the cost of equity  E k  and the cost of debt  D k  are weighted by the market value-based 
proportion of equity and debt in the capital structure (Damodaran, 1996). The imputed cost of equity 
IE k  is defined as the contribution margin from the cost of equity over the cost of capital of 100% debt 
finance (i.e. full leverage), so that  
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A numerical example illustrates the effect of (true sale) securitisation on the imputed (economic) cost 
of equity. Let us assume that the issuer holds exactly 8% equity (which would match the 8%    9 
minimum capital requirement of banks for 100% risk-weighted assets and no risk weight reduction 
under Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2004)10 and shareholder require at least 15% return on equity 
at a debt-to-equity ratio of  % 7 . 8 92 . 0 08 . 0 ≈  (see Tab. 2). Hence, the imputed cost of equity before 
securitisation amounts to 
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By accepting a first loss position (FLP) of 3%, the issuer now holds 3% instead of 8% equity after 
completion of the securitisation transaction. The imputed cost of equity has fallen from 0.80% to  
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In our calculation the reduction of the imputed cost of equity by 0.51% percentage points in off-
balance sheet refinancing stems from lower capital coverage, which could eventually reach zero in the 
extreme case of full leverage. In order to gauge the implications of different levels of imputed 
(marginal) cost of equity on shareholder return, we consider the net return of securitisation before 
and after including the cost of equity. We subtract the “total direct cost of debt” (weighted cost of 
debt, expected loan loss (and the cost of credit enhancement for the case of securitisation)) from the 
expected “return on securitisable assets” (“return on available assets”) for off-balance sheet (on-
balance sheet) funding in order to derive the net return before the (weighted) cost of equity before 
(after) securitisation. Dividing this result by total equity capital yields the return on equity, which is 
clearly higher in the case of the off-balance debt refinancing (21.92%) compared to conventional on-
balance sheet funding (17.50%). 
 
The off-balance sheet conversion of securitised assets through the issuance of securitised debt also 
involves a change in the riskiness of debt as the return on equity increases. The default distribution of 
securitised assets shall serve as a straightforward example to illustrate this point. Since issuers 
commonly retain a first loss position (FLP) as “concentrated risk exposure” to cover expected losses 
only (see Fig. 3), any loss in excess of FLP is transferred to capital market investors via securitised 
debt. Although the weighted cost of debt increases in a higher debt-to-equity ratio, the transfer of 
economic risk implied by the reduction in equity (as FLP) from 8% to 3% alters the issuer’s residual 
risk exposure from credit default and caps the probability density at expected default loss. 
    10 
Debt capital 92.00% Debt 97.00%
Equity capital 8.00% Equity 3.00%
Total capital 100.00% Total capital 100.00%
Return of available assets 7.00% Return of securitisable assets 7.00%
Weighted cost of equity (CoE) 1.20% Weighted cost of equity (CoE) 0.45%
Weighted cost of debt (CoD) 4.60% Weighted cost of debt (CoD) 5.00%
Risk-free rate  4.50% Risk-free rate  4.50%
Corporate risk spread 0.50% Corporate risk spread 0.50%
ABS structuring cost 0.25%
WACC 5.80% WACC 5.45%
Imputed cost of equity 0.80% Imputed cost of equity 0.30%
Expected (credit) loss (EL) 1.00% Expected (credit) loss (EL) 1.00%
Credit enhancement (CE) 0.25%
Total direct cost 5.60% Total direct cost 6.34%
(CoD + EL) (CoD + EL + CE)
Net return  Net return 
before CoE 1.40% before CoE 0.66%
after CoE 0.20% after CoE 0.21%
Return on equity (RoE) 17.50% Return on equity (RoE) 21.92%
On-balance sheet funding Off-balance sheet funding
 
Tab. 1. Simplified calculation of imputed cost of capital and net return from asset securitisation. 
 
This risk sharing arrangement creates leveraged investment, where the risk-return profile of issued 
tranches differs from the risk-return profile of direct investment in the underlying assets. The 
leveraged loss exposure of securitised debt relative to the overall notional amount of securitised 
assets depends on the level of expected loss covered by the issuer through FLP (“enhancement 
level”) to make securitised debt less sensitive to moderate value changes of securitised assets. At the 
same time, the retention of “concentrated risk exposure” lowers the amount of required economic 
(equity) capital if ex ante total default loss (i.e. expected and unexpected loss) from securitised assets 
originally exceeded FLP. If the resultant decrease of the imputed cost of equity from economic risk 
transfer releases liquid funds at a higher net return after cost of equity asset securitisation increases 
total return on equity of the issuing firm. Note that the configuration of securitisation itself might 
imply interest rate and liquidity risk (see section 3.1) depending on the nature of the underlying 
reference portfolio of securitised assets and the security design of the transaction at hand, which 
complicate the economic rationale of securitisation beyond this admittedly simplified illustration (see 
section 5).     11 
Fig. 3. Economic risk transfer.11 
 
4  General investment risks in asset securitisation 
 
Securitisation is commonly understood as an important risk management tool, mainly because its 
inherent differentiation and integration process (“risk restructuring”) allows issuers to reduce their 
cost of investment funding by segregating the risk exposure of a designated pool of assets.12 
However, the conversion of balance-sheet risk into marketable securitised debt involves refined and 
complicated financial structures, which affect how credit (or asset) risk, market risk, liquidity risk and 
operational risk concur in securitised debt (see Fig. 4). The degree of investment risk in asset 
securitisation stems from two areas, namely (i) the characteristics and performance of existing and/or 
future receivables and other financial assets as sources of payments to the securitisation transaction 
(collateral level) as well as (ii) the allocation and distribution of payments from securitised assets to 
holders of the various tranches of issued debt securities (security level) in accordance with specific 
payment priorities and loss tolerance levels. 
 
4.1  Credit risk 
 
First and foremost, investors in securitisation transactions are concerned with the credit (or asset) risk 
of fully and timely repayment of securitised assets in the underlying reference portfolio. Although 
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credit risk transfer by means of structured finance debt obligations lies at the core of risk 
management through securitisation, there is a host of further credit risk contingencies beyond the 
collateral level, such as the servicing function of securitised assets, the payment of administrative fees 
to the SPV, the transfer of payments from debtors to investors and counterparty risk. Issuers apply 
structural provisions to mitigate credit risk, such as (internal or external) credit enhancement and risk-
sharing mechanisms (through the subordination of issued debt securities) to attain a desired credit risk 
profile for issued debt securities. 
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Fig. 4. Fundamental investment risks in asset securitisation. 
 
4.2  Structural risks 
 
Market risk in securitisation mainly stems from adverse effects of interest rate and exchange rate 
movements on the issuer’s cash flow management to repay securitised debt. In transactions with 
varying repayment terms and multiple (unhedged) currency denominations of securitised assets the 
payment agent of the transaction (i.e. the SPV or the issuer, if the transaction is completed without a 
SPV as conduit) would need to reconcile expected repayment from securitised assets (fixed or 
floating) with coupon payments (fixed or floating) to securitised debt issued to investors in order to 
minimise term structure risk, reinvestment risk and/or base risk.13 Failure to do so would cause 
fundamental market fluctuations to upset the scheduled amortisation and the timeliness of 
contractually agreed repayment to investors (balance sheet-based liquidity risk). The same considerations 
of balanced cash flow management apply analogously in the case of currency risk exposures on the 
basis of covered interest rate parity. Both currency and interest rate risks are frequently hedged with    13 
standard derivative tools, such as cross-currency swaps and interest rate swaps. Additionally, market-
based liquidity risk arises from high trading cost (Duffie and Gârleanu, 2001) associated with a small 
market volume of outstanding securitised debt issues and low trading activity in asset securitisation 
markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Asymmetric information problems in securitisation. 
 
Given the evolving regulatory and legal treatment of asset securitisation in response to perpetual 
financial innovation in structured finance, legal uncertainty from securitised debt is a major concern of 
investors and issuers. Asset securitisation involves a multitude of legal issues, such as trade law 
compliance of true sale structures, the implementation of legal claims (insolvency risk and set-off 
risk), information disclosure under divergent national banking laws and income tax liability (tax 
attribution risk), which affect both asset originators and issuers. These aspects will not be addressed 
within the scope of this paper. We refer readers to Kraakman and Hausmann (2000a and 2000b), 
Sullivan (1998), Frost (1997-1998) and Kravit (1997). 
 
Moreover, the variety of credit and legal risks from securitised asset exposures go hand in hand with 
operational risk from the intricate structural arrangements of securitisation transactions (see Fig. 5). In 
the presence of asymmetric information originators and issuers might be tempted to pursue own 
economic incentives, which imposes substantial agency cost on efficient asset securitisation. First and 
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foremost, market imperfection due to information asymmetry from valuation uncertainty could lead 
to moral hazard on part of issuers (asset originators in true sale transactions)14 if their effort level before 
and after the issue date is not incentive compatible with investor interests. Issuers (asset originators) 
could (i) retain a disproportionately large share of high-quality assets from the designated pool of 
securitised assets (reference portfolio) and replace them by assets of inferior quality (ex ante moral 
hazard), or (ii) neglect (or even relinquish altogether) the costly enforcement of contractual 
restrictions imposed on debtors (“effort choice”), whose payment obligations have been securitised 
(ex post moral hazard). Given the impending transfer of asset exposures through securitisation asset 
originators might reduce monitoring of securitised assets or exhibit selective bias in the composition 
of the securitised reference portfolio due to private information about individual asset exposures 
(cherry picking). Overall, both ex ante and ex post moral hazard involve the expropriation of investor 
wealth if issuers (asset originators) engage in selective bias as to the asset composition of the 
securitised reference portfolio or precipitate reduced effort levels as regards risk monitoring and 
portfolio administration after issuing securitised debt.15 
 
Given the significant agency cost from moral hazard, issuers install support mechanisms, which 
transpire incentive compatible behaviour towards investors so as to mitigate investment risk from 
asymmetric information. The detrimental effects of moral hazard are generally resolved through a 
subordinated security design and a first loss position (FLP) or credit enhancement16,17 provided by 
originators to indicate their willingness to bear most (if not all) expected loss from the securitised 
assets (Jobst, 2003b and 2003c) as an effort choice against ex ante moral hazard (Frost, 1997).18  
 
The complex security design of securitised debt also suggests superior information of issuers about 
the true valuation of securitised debt. Hence, rational investors would form negative beliefs about the 
actual quality of securitised assets and expect the adverse selection of securitised debt with poor 
reference portfolios similar to the lemons market problem à la Akerlof (1970). Since investors assume all 
(or most) transactions to be of poor quality, they request a reservation utility in the form of a lower 
selling price and/or higher return (“underpricing”) as compensation for the anticipated investment 
risk of a disproportionately large share of poor transactions in the securitisation market. In 
cognisance of the asymmetric information issuers suppress the pecuniary charge associated with the 
lemons premium by soliciting increased transparency about the true value of securitised assets through 
signalling and screening mechanisms. Commonly issuers commit additional internal and external 
resources to a securitisation transaction, such as reserve funds, variable proceeds from excess spread 
as well as second loss positions and liquidity facilities, as a costly signal of asset quality.  
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Issuers of asset-backed securities have to carefully balance this array of potential investment risks 
(credit risk, structural risk and legal risk) against the economic benefits of securitisation. Certainly, an 
informed securitisation decision will need to consider the suitability of the type of assets to be 
securitised. In the following section we analyse possible ways more illiquid assets, such as SME-
related claims, are securitised by financial institutions and corporations. 
 
5  Asset securitisation of SME-related claims 
 
While mostly bank-sponsored structured finance has been in the limelight of finance professionals, 
growing internationalisation of business relationships and capital market-based business models have 
encouraged also non-financial enterprises to consider asset securitisation as a more cost efficient 
form of corporate finance. Corporate issuers mainly employ securitisation in order to both diversify 
funding sources at more competitive capital costs and pro-actively manage balance sheet growth. 
Especially large corporations have begun to replace traditional on-balance sheet debt and equity 
finance by securitised debt as an alternative external source of corporate finance to convert illiquid 
payment claims from services and deliverables (trade receivables) into marketable, commoditised 
debt. This proposition of corporate securitisation, however, does not apply to small- and medium 
sized companies (SMEs), which largely remain dependent on bank lending and private equity, mainly 
because low turnover, weak public disclosure of accounts and high monitoring effort inhibit direct 
access to capital markets.19 At the same time, shrinking margins from interest-based deposit business 
and new, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital standards (Basle Committee, 2004) keep banks hard 
pressed to adopt a more stringent long-term lending policy, which leaves risky borrowers most 
affected. Against this background, SMEs find themselves squeezed in the middle between rising 
borrowing cost in traditional channels of bank finance and restricted capital market access.  
 
Although corporate securitisation has become a favourite structured finance instruments for an 
expedient reorganisation of financial relationships, technical barriers to entry (e.g. critical amounts 
securitisable asset exposure and prohibitive start-up costs) have dissuaded smaller companies from 
directly accessing asset securitisation markets without the support of financial institutions. Aside 
from bank-sponsored loan securitisation through collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP)  programmes have evolved as an alternative form of asset securitisation, 
whose flexibility (in terms of security design and underlying asset type) and disclosure requirements 
about securitised assets remedy existing market challenges of refinancing SME-related exposures. 
ABCP programmes are typically administered by bankruptcy-remote SPVs to finance the acquisition 
of consumer and commercial receivable pools or securities of varying maturity with the proceeds of    16 
short-term commercial notes issued to capital market investors. The most common types of 
exposures sold by asset originators to these conduits are trade receivables, consumer loans, 
mortgages as well as lesser known asset classes, such as auto rentals and revenues from whole 
business and project finance. While some financial institutions use ABCPs for the sole purpose of 
refinancing their own lending activity on the back of existing or revolving asset pools, many banking 
organisations (called “arrangers”) have successfully sponsored multi-seller ABCP securitisation 
programmes to fund corporate clients by securitising their asset exposures from trade receivables via 
SPVs. This refinancing mechanism allows banks to extend loans to corporate customers in return for 
their contribution of payment claims to a standing asset portfolio.20 Corporate banking clients, 
especially SMEs, benefit from the cost efficient funding through ABCP conduits. In SME conduits of 
multi-seller ABCPs especially small companies can seek indirect funding from capital markets in 
return for selling their payment claims from trade receivables to the SPV (“liquidity generation”).21 
Multi-seller ABCPs in the dealer-placed commercial paper market offer intermediated access to 
securitisation markets for small-scale originators, whose collateralisation of commercial receivables 
works up the spectrum of refinancing alternatives. ABCP programmes frequently decrease overall 
refinancing costs (after consideration of transaction costs) to a level lower than what would have 
been obtainable in conventional on-balance sheet external finance (such as bank debt) and 
standalone off-balance sheet funding (project finance ABS and whole business ABS). Such a 
reduction in the financing cost mainly derives from the diversification effect of pooling individual 
asset claims into the securitised reference portfolio and the higher rating classification of ABCP 
programmes thanks to credit de-linkage and bankruptcy remoteness of issued debt securities from 
the originator. ABCP has become a popular source of external finance particularly in those countries, 
where more stringent bank lending have dried up conventional channels of credit supply amid a 
deteriorating equity base. In summary, asset-backed securitisation (ABS) techniques that involve the 
issuance of structured claims on the performance of SME-related payment claims, such as trade 
receivables by SMEs, future operating revenues from SMEs and SME loans originated by financial 
institutions, are specified as follows: 
 
(i)  Channels of securitised asset refinancing by corporations (“corporate securitisation”): 
a.  indirect: Multi-seller asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programmes are methods of 
securitisation sponsored by financial institutions to facilitate the funding of selected 
asset exposures on a short-term basis. If these assets are trade receivables of SMEs 
the ABCP programme is referred to as a SME conduit. 
b.  direct: Companies themselves engage in asset-backed securitisation (ABS) by 
securitising own payment claims, such as long-term revenues from entire operations,    17 
a particular line of business (whole business ABS) or defined project cash flows (project 
ABS).22 
 
(ii)  Channels of securitised asset refinancing by banks: banks securitise medium-term and 
long-term SME credit exposures in large scale asset-backed transactions, so-called SME 
collateralised loan obligations (CLOs).23 
 
In the next section we use the example of Germany to extract important lessons from the 
development of SME securitisation in a historically bank-dominated financial system with a strong 
SME sector. 
 
6  The German approach to SME securitisation 
 
6.1  Asset securitisation in Germany 
 
The German bank-centred financial system is renowned Hausbanken (“house banks”) as a hallmark of 
a close-knit network of long-term lending relationships, with capital markets playing only a minor 
role in external finance. More than three million German Mittelstand (SME) companies represent the 
backbone of the German economy24 and are traditionally financed by banks, which partly refinance 
their exposures by “on-lending”25 through government-sponsored credit programmes26 as secured 
credit finance. This make-up of the financial system has made corporate lending vulnerable to 
mounting competitive pressure on already beleaguered banks. Tighter risk controls of revised bank 
capital standards and higher investor demands on equity returns poised German banks to recognise 
the new reality of a more risk-return oriented approach. After the U.K. mortgage lending companies 
were the first financial institutions to debut modern securitisation in Europe, especially large German 
commercial banks, such as Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank fully embraced asset-backed 
securitisation through CLOs and ABCPs as one possibility to marry the benefits of credit business 
with fixed income management Surprisingly, such bank-sponsored securitisation of payment claims 
also included SME-related obligations early on. This development is remarkable to the extent that 
reflects the potential of a bank-based financial system to seize on an inherently capital market-based 
structured finance technique to refinance highly illiquid asset exposures.  
 
In 1998 the first German SME portfolio was securitised by Deutsche Bank in CORE 1998-1.27 After 
Deutsche Bank had launched this first large-scale true sale loan securitisation transaction in 
Germany, other large commercial banks quickly followed suit and enlisted securitisation as a    18 
refinancing technology to unload highly illiquid SME credit exposures. At the same time, one 
prominent government-sponsored credit programme administered by the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) for the promotion of SME loans and residential mortgages28 has been amended by an asset-
backed securitisation scheme to provide more cost-efficient funding to bank creditors wishing to 
refinance the origination  of such asset exposures. In this way KfW envisaged to discharge its public 
service obligation of alleviating competitive pressures of commercial banks to adopt more stringent 
lending conditions for SME and private mortgage loans. Overall, German commercial banks have 
quite successfully pursued the securitisation of SME loans over the last six years – either as 
standalone transactions or sponsored by securitisation platforms of quasi-government agencies, such 
as KfW’s PROMISE (Promotional Mittelstand Loan Securitisation) synthetic CLO programme, 
which so far has issued 12 transactions at total market value of more than €17.4 billion (U.S.$20.9 
billion) in collaboration with large private banks such as HVB (HypoVereinsbank) Group, 
Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank since its inception at the end of 2000.29  
 
Although many German SMEs have become aware of the benefits associated with direct ABS 
transactions in view of more stringent bank lending conditions, they have not made the securitisation 
of trade receivables an integral part of their refinancing decisions.30 Hence, amidst sporadic corporate 
securitisation (such as Tenovis Finance Ltd. (2001) and Volkswagen Car Lease No.1-3 (1999-2002) to 
name two well-known examples), bank-sponsored securitisation – be it through SME CLOs (with and 
without the involvement of KfW as arranger) or SME conduits – constitutes the main driver of 
incipient SME securitisation in Germany. 
 
6.2  The KfW PROMISE platform and the “True Sale Initiative” (TSI) 
 
6.2.1  The KfW PROMISE platform  
 
In anticipation of potential structural changes and associated adverse effects on lending conditions 
due to tighter risk controls in the German banking sector, the PROMISE platform assists German 
financial institutions to achieve regulatory capital relief (see section 2.1) for securitised SME lending. 
Further reasons for the prominence of KfW’s securitisation programme include the limitation of the 
economist cost of capital and the generation of additional liquidity from an alternative source of 
external finance. The standardised securitisation structure of PROMISE CLOs is based on a partially 
funded, synthetic transaction, where the originating bank enters into a credit default swap (CDS) with 
KfW as protection provider, taking over the entire default risk of a selected pool of SME loan 
exposures (i.e. the notional value of the reference portfolio of assets) (see Fig. 6). The transferred    19 
credit risk is subsequently structured in subordinated set of tranches with different seniority, so that 
the largest share of the risk exposure (80-90%) carries hardly any default risk. This co-called “super-
senior” tranche is passed onto another bank (preferably an OECD bank for a low risk-weighting of 
the risk transfer) via a senior CDS. The first loss position (FLP), the most junior tranche, which 
carries almost all of the expected default loss (based on historic default rates), is retained by the 
originating bank or covered by a junior CDS. KfW sells the remaining mezzanine tranches as 
subordinated bonds (credit-linked notes (CLNs)) to capital markets via a SPV, which operates under 
the PROMISE platform and assumes credit-linked certificates of indebtedness to link the issued 
CLNs to the reference portfolio. The SPV might seek collateralisation by a third party up to the 
notional amount of the issued CLNs. 
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Fig. 6. The KfW PROMISE securitisation platform structure. 
 
In are more advanced security design, KfW accommodates several loan portfolios of different banks 
in a slightly modified structure. In 2002 KfW made inroads with the diversification demands raised 
by the stratified German mortgage loan market by arranging a multi-seller securitisation transaction (see 
section 5) with the cooperative mortgage bank DG Hyp (Deutsche Genossenschafts-
Hypothekenbank AG) as originator, where the credit risk of several portfolios of credit cooperatives 
were pooled with DG Hyp and placed in the capital market via the KfW’s PROMISE platform 
(PROMISE 2002-C). This arrangement would also allow smaller financial institutions to resort to 
securitisation conduits as an alternative refinancing mechanism. In this way, KfW extends the reach 
of securitisation in the effort to maintain the viability of SME lending under the KfW’s promotional 
credit programme. 
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6.2.2  The “True Sale Initiative”(TSI) 
 
True sale securitisation has remained scare in Germany due to regulatory and taxation constraints as 
well as unresolved legal issues as regards redemption criteria and insolvency proceedings in cross-
border disputes. For instance, it took until 1997 (BaFin, 1997a and 1997b; Bartelt, 1999), when the 
national regulatory body for banking supervision, the German Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt für Kreditwesen (BaFin)), first permitted the use of ABS,31,32 at a time when 
the U.S. and most all (Western) European countries had already put in place a legal framework for 
true sale securitisation. Moreover, in 2003 the German trade tax (Gewerbesteuer) law, a major obstacle 
to true sale securitisations in the past, was amended by the Act to the Support of Small Businesses 
(Gesetz zur Förderung von Kleinunternehmen und zur Verbesserung der Unternehmensfinanzierung),  which 
exempts SPVs purchasing certain receivables originated by banks in (true sale) securitisation 
transactions from trade tax. Also further efforts are underway to actively promote true sale 
transaction structures in the bid to (i) improve the external financing of SMEs by creating an 
alternative source of funds, and (ii) facilitate the risk management of asset originators by way of 
securitising SME loans. 
 
In keeping with its public service task of safeguarding adequate private and SME sector financing the 
KfW also sponsored the so-called “True Sale Initiative” (TSI) as a concerted effort of German banks 
to facilitate traditional off-balance sheet (true sale) asset securitisation in Germany, targeting a capital-
market segment whose national development has been retarded by unfavourable legal, tax and 
accounting provisions. After consultation with market participants, supervisory authorities and rating 
agencies the TSI puts forth a uniform securitisation platform, which promises to lower refinancing 
cost and capital charges for credit exposures securitised by participating banks. According to a joint 
statement released on 12 December 2003 by representatives of the 13 participating banks – the most 
important commercial banks, cooperative banks and the savings bank group33 – the proposed TSI 
foundation structure (see Fig. 7) establishes a multi-seller securitisation platform as a standing 
arrangement for the formation of SPVs as insolvency-remote ABS issuers. The economic case for 
TSI derives from the development of a cost-efficient, ready-made securitisation infrastructure, which 
allows participating banks to securitise reference loan portfolios through newly established SPVs 
within a foundation structure.  
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Fig. 7. The TSI securitisation platform structure. 
 
The structural model of TSI is comprised of a limited liability service company (“TSI Service 
GmbH”) as servicing agent and three non-profit foundations (charitable trusts), which jointly create 
separate SPVs as limited liability company under German law (“GmbH”) to refinance each loan 
portfolio bought from a participating bank. The SPV converts the payment received from a reference 
portfolio of securitised assets into tradable debt securities. The TSI Service GmbH is also charged 
with the tasks of (i) developing uniform minimum standards for (true sale) securitisation in terms of 
both reporting and administration and (ii) providing a forum of exchange for originating banks. 
Overall, the structure of TSI conspicuously emulates the economic logic of large-scale (indirect) 
synthetic securitisation facilitated by the KfW-sponsored PROMISE and PROVIDE securitisation 
programmes (see section 6.2.1), which aim to dissuade German banks from restrained SME and 
private mortgage lending as they adjust their risk exposure in the face of rising competitive pressures 
on traditional funding. Given an apparent lack of a gross-roots conviction of German corporations 
to make asset securitisation an important source of external finance any time soon the multi-seller 
design of TSI provides brokered access to securitisation markets as an alternative form of refinancing 
to small and regional banks in a financial system, where the dominance of bank-based external 
finance has so far thwarted any serious attempt at establishing large-scale corporate securitisation. 
 
6.3  Lessons learned from SME securitisation in Germany 
 
Although the case of quasi-government sponsored asset securitisation in Germany is limited in scale 
and scope, the successful introduction of synthetic securitisation platforms by KfW bears witness to    22 
the capacity of a heavily bank-dominated financial system to absorb a capital market-based 
refinancing tool. It also reveals the appreciable influence of efficient and transparent 
securitisation on the willingness of banks to securitise SME loan exposures to realise strategic and 
operational objectives. Although securitisation markets generally have been equivocal about a 
preferred transaction type (true sale vs. synthetic securitisation), in Germany the volume of partially 
or unfunded, synthetic ABS transaction structures have outstripped fully-funded traditional (true 
sale) ABS structures at a ratio of roughly 25 to 1 in 2002, while only €1.31 billion (U.S.$1.57 billion) 
of the €32.8 billion (U.S.$39.3 billion) total involved true sale transactions (Althaus et al., 2003). The 
synthetic nature of the German ABS term market due to the predominance of large scale KfW-
arranged transactions (PROMISE and PROVIDE) and several ABS/ABCP securitisation schemes 
developed by large German commercial banks (e.g. CORE, CAST, GLOBE and HAUS by Deutsche 
Bank, GELDILUX by HVB Group and SILVERTOWER by Dresdner Bank to name a few) 
indicates that mainly systemic obstacles (e.g. the trade taxation of SPVs of true sale transactions in 
Germany) have fuelled the growth of synthetic securitisation, which caters to the optimisation of 
regulatory capital and risk management rather than efficient refinancing (which typically applies to 
true sale structures).34 At the same time, standardised securitisation structures have contributed to 
informed investment and lower issuing cost. Hence, the case of asset securitisation in Germany is 
instructive as to how institutional constraints shape the nature of securitisation, whose structural 
versatility offers economic benefits irrespective of the configuration of the financial system. It also 
suggests that a bank-based financial system like Germany would be more likely to see the 
development of mature securitisation markets to be determined by financial sector initiatives, whose 
reach and intensity might be enhanced by top-down initiatives of quasi-government agencies like 
KfW. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
In the previous sections we attempted to equally privilege the benefits and drawbacks associated with 
asset securitisation by financial institutions and corporations. We also explained the various forms of 
ABS structures as they pertain to the securitisation of SME-related claims. Finally, we review the 
evolution of the German securitisation market in order to highlight salient stepping stones in the 
process of establishing the securitisation of SME-related payment obligations in a financial system, 
where bank-based external finance coincides with a strong presence of SMEs in industrial 
production. Overall, SME securitisation as an alternative source of liquid funds seems promising 
amid increased political attempts t o  f o s t e r  w h a t  c o u l d  b e  r e g a r d ed a level playing field in the 
regulation, taxation and legal treatment of asset securitisation across countries. The elimination of    23 
significant national disparities in these areas, especially as regards true sale transactions, would 
certainly be highly desirable to expand the spectrum of “securitisable assets” to include more illiquid 
and heterogeneous asset classes, such as SME-related payment claims. So far SME securitisation 
remains largely limited to indirect securitisation transactions, where mainly banks issue securitised 
debt on the back of SME-related claims to fund future lending activities. At the same time, smaller 
corporations in capital-market based financial systems (e.g. the U.K. and the U.S.) would enlist the 
help of banks as arrangers of securitisation transactions due to costly direct capital market access. 
However, as banking competition dries up traditional channels of funding riskier SME borrowers, 
the search for alternative sources of capital might encourage SMEs to consider asset securitisation to 
meet funding needs by pledging asset receivables to multi-seller ABCPs. Also lower agency cost of 
asymmetric information vis-à-vis external investors in securitisation transactions (which are valued on 
the specific performance of a designated asset portfolio) might give securitised debt an edge over 
other forms of external finance. Banks would be more inclined to make use of uniform securitisation 
platforms (such as KfW’s PROMISE deal structure) to lower the refinancing cost of SME loans they 
are inevitably bound to originate due to traditionally higher risk-adjusted margins from SME loans 
and/or high macroeconomic importance of SMEs as commercial borrowers (like in Germany). 
Although substantial legal uncertainty and incompatible financing strategies may render securitisation 
less pressing for SMEs than for the banking industry, it is safe to say that it might not be too long 
until asset securitisation will join ranks with traditional (intermediated) debt finance.    24 
 
8  References 
 
Albach, H. (1983), “Die Bedeutung Mittelständischer Unternehmen in der Marktwirtschaft, Zeitschrift 
für Betriebwirtschaft, Vol. 53, No. 9, 870-88.  
Althaus, T., Billen, S. and S. Miehs (2003), “Record German Securitisation Volumes Strengthen 
Market’s Position Among European Players,” Standard and Poor’s Research (5 February), 
Frankfurt am Main. 
Akerlof, G. A. (1970), “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, 488-500. 
Albach, H. (1983), “Die Bedeutung Mittelständischer Unternehmen in der Marktwirtschaft, Zeitschrift 
für Betriebwirtschaft, Vol. 53, No. 9, 870-88.  
Altrock, F. and S. Rieso (1999), “Why Asset Backed Securities?,” Die Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 59, No. 2, 
279-82. 
Bär, H. P. (1998). Asset Securitisation - Die Verbriefung von Finanzaktiven als innovative Finanzierungstechnik 
und neue Herausforderung für Banken. Bank- und Finanzwirtschaftliche Forschung, Paul Haupt 
Verlag, Bern/Stuttgart/Vienna. 
Bär, H. P. (1997), “Asset Securitisation: Die Verbriefung von Finanzaktiven als Innovative 
Finanzierungstechnik und Neue Herausforderung für Banken,” Schriftenreihe ‘Bank- und 
finanzwirtschaftliche Forschungen, Vol. 262, Bern. 
Bartelt, N. (1999), “Asset-Backed Securities: Ein Produkt für Deutsche Banken,” Wiesbaden. 
Basle Committee (2004). International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Basle 
Committee Publications No. 107 (11 May) (available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm). 
Basle Committee (2002a), “Second Working Paper on Asset-Backed Securitisation”, Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), October. 
Basle Committee (2002b), “Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) 3 Technical Guidance: Credit Risk – 
Securitisation Framework,” Bank for International Settlements (BIS), October (available at 
www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3tech.pdf) 
Basle Committee (2001), “First Working Paper on Asset-Backed Securitisation”, Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), October. 
Becker, K. G. and J. Speaks (1996), “Moody’s Approach to Rating SBA Loan-backed Securities,” The 
Financier ACMT, Vol. 3, No. 3 (available at http://www.the-
financier.com/finance/9v3n3.pdf).    25 
Benveniste, L. M. and A. N. Berger (1987), “Securitization With Recourse: An Instrument That 
Offers Uninsured Bank Depositors Sequential Claims,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 11, 
403-24. 
Berger, A. N. and G. Udell (1993), “Securitization, Risk and the Liquidity Problem in Banking” in: 
Klausner, M and L. White (eds.) Structural Change in Banking. Irwin, Homewood, IL, 227-88. 
Berkovitch, E. and E. H. Kim (1990), “Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and 
Underinvestment Incentives,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 45, 765-94. 
Bernard, C., Nicolaus , S., and G. Rajendra (2003), “European Asset-Backed Barometer – Weekly 
Market Monitor’ Deutsche Bank, Global Markets Research, Securitisation (7 July), 2. 
Bluhm, C. (2003), “CDO Modeling: Techniques, Examples and Applications, Working Papers Credit 
Derivatives, Default Risk, 10 December (available at http://www.defaultrisk.com). 
Böhringer, M., Lotz, U., Solbach, C. and J. Wentzler (2001), “Conventional Versus Synthetic 
Securitisation – Trends in the German ABS Market,” Deloitte & Touche, Düsseldorf (May). 
Bund, S. (2000a), “Asset Securitisation, Anwendbarkeit und Einsatzmöglichkeiten in Deutschen 
Universalkreditinstituten,” edited by J. H. von Stein, Vol. 8, Hohenheim. 
Bund, S. (2000b), “Collateralised Debt Obligations: Die Formel 1 Unter den Asset-Backed 
Securities,” Die Bank, Vol. 55, No. 3, 196-200. 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (BaFin) (1997a), “Anschreiben zum Rundschreiben 4/97,” 
(available at http://www.bakred.de/texte/rundsch/anrs4_97.html). 
Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (BaFin) (1997b), “Rundschreiben 4/97 an alle 
Kreditinstitute in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Veräußerung von Kundenforderungen 
im Rahmen von Asset-Backed Securities-Transaktionen durch Deutsche Kreditinstitute,” 
Berlin (19 March). 
Canor, R., Dorer, J., Levenstein, L. and S. Qian (2000), “Moody’s Portfolio Risk Model for Financial 
Guarantors,” Moody’s Investors Service, Global Credit Research, Special Comment (July), 
New York. 
Cantwell, D. (1996), “How Public Corporations Use Securitization in Meeting Financial Needs: The 
Case of Chrysler Financial Corporation,” in: Kendall, L. T. and M. J. Fishman (eds.) A Primer 
on Securitization. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Damodaran, A. (1996). Investment Valuation - Tools and Techniques For Determining the Value of Any Asset. 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York. 
DeMarzo, P. and D. Duffie (1999), “A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design,” Econometrica, Vol. 
67, No. 1, 65-99. 
Deutsche Bank AG (1999), “Offering Circular: CAST 1999-1,” Global Markets Research, London. 
Deutsche Bank Global Markets (UK) Ltd. (1998), “Offering Circular: CORE 1998-1,” London.    26 
Duffie, D. and N. Gârleanu (2001), “Risk and Valuation of Collateralised Debt Obligations,” 
Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 57, No. 1, 41-59. 
Eck, T. van (1998), “Collateralised Bond Obligations, Collateralised Loan Obligations: The Markets 
and The Securities,” The Securitization Conduit, Vol. 1, No. 4. 
Edwards, D. (2001), “Patent Backed Securitization: Blueprint for a New Asset Class,” SecuritizationNet 
(available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/gerling_new_0302.pdf). 
Eichholz, R. (2000), “Neue Trends bei Strukturierten Finanzierungen,” Börsenzeitung, No. 209 (28 
October), B 6. 
Elsas, R. und J.-P. Krahnen (1999), “Collateral, Default Risk, and Relationship Lending: An 
Empirical Study on Financial Contracting,” Working Paper 13, Center For Financial Studies, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
Fabozzi, F. J. and D. Yuen (1998) (eds.). Managing MBS Portfolios. Wiley Europe. 
Falcone, Y. F. and J. Gluck (1998), “Moody’s Approach to Rating Market-Value CDOs, Moody’s 
Investor Services, Structured Finance, Special Report (April) (available at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/cdo/news/MoodysMarketValueCDO.pdf). 
Finanzgruppe Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV) (2004), “Diagnose Mittelstand 
2004,” Berlin (available at 
http://www.sage.de/public/downloads/diagnose_mittelstand_2004.pdf). 
Frankel, T. (1991), “Securitisation: Structured Financing, Financial Asset Pools and Asset-Backed 
Securities,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 6, 64-86. 
Frost, C. W. (1997-1998), “Asset Securitisation and Corporate Risk Allocation,” Tulane Law Review, 
Vol. 72, 72-152. 
Gluck, J. and H. Remeza (2000), “Moody’s Approach to Rating Multisector CDOs,” Moody’s 
Investor Service, Structured Finance, Special Report, September (available at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/cdo/news/MoodysMultiSectorCDO.pdf). 
Glüder, D. and H. Böhm (2003), “Neue KfW-Modelle – Innovationen im Fördergeschäft,“ Zeitschrift 
für das gesamte Kreditwesen, Vol. 21, 1182-86. 
Gorton, G. und G. Pennacchi (1995), “Banks and Loan Sales – Marketing Nonmarketable Assets,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389-411. 
Greenbaum, S. I. and Thakor, J.V. (1987), “Bank Funding Modes: Securitisation Versus Deposits,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 11, 379-92. 
Herrmann, M. and J. Tierney (1999), “The Market for CLOs in Germany,” Deutsche Bank Asset-
Backed Research, London.    27 
Howard, D. and Merritt, R. (1997), “Bank Collateralised Loan Obligations: An Overview,” Fitch 
IBCA, Structured Finance, Asset-Backed Special Report, New York, 18th December 
(available at http://www.fitchibca.com/corporate/reports/report.cfm?rpt_id=21539). 
IMF (2004), “Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR): Market Developments and Issues,” 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Capital Markets Department (ICM), 
Washington, D.C. (April), 152. 
James, C. (1988), “The Use of Loan Sales and Standby Letters of Credit by Commercial Banks,” 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22, 395-422.  
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, 305-60. 
Jobst, A. (2004), “The Basle Securitisation Framework Explained: The Regulatory Treatment of 
Asset Securitisation,” Center for Financial Studies (CFS) Working Papers Series 2004/21, 
Frankfurt. Forthcoming in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 13, No. 1. 
Jobst, A. (2003a), “Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs): A Primer,” The Securitization Conduit, Vol. 
6, Nos. 1-4. 
Jobst, A. (2003b), “Loan Securitisation and Moral Hazard – Is Increased Transparency More 
Beneficial ?,” The ICFAI Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 9, No. 9 (December), 5-30. 
Jobst, A. (2003c), “Verbriefung und Ihre Auswirkung auf die Finanzmarktstabilität,” Working Paper 
Series: Finance and Accounting, J.W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main (October) 
(available at http://www.bfinance.de). 
Kendall, L. (1996). A Primer on Securitisation. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
KfW Group (2003), “Our Current Work: True Sale Initiative,” Frankfurt am Main (available at 
http://www.kfw.de/EN/Die%20Bank/KfWUpdates60/TrueSaleIn.jsp). 
Kohler, K. E. (1998), “Collateralised Loan Obligations: A Powerful New Portfolio Management 
Tool For Banks,” The Securitization Conduit, Vol. 1, No. 2, 6-15. 
Kraakman, R. H. and H. Hausmann (2000a), “The Essential Role of Organisational Law,” Yale Law 
Journal, Vol. 110, 387. 
Kraakman, R. H. and H. Hausmann (2000b), “Organisational Law And Asset Partitioning,” European 
Economic Review, Vol. 44, 807. 
Kravit, J. (1997), “Securitisation of Financial Assets,” Aspen Law and Business, New York. 
Lang, L. H. P., Poulsen, A. and R. Stulz (1995), “Asset Sales, Firm Performance and the Agency 
Costs of Managerial Discretion,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 37, 3-38. 
Leland, H. (1998), “Agency Cost, Risk Management and Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, 
1213-43.    28 
Leyland and Pyle (1977) “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial 
Intermediation,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, No. 2, 371-87. 
Lockwood, L. J., Rutherford, R. C. and M. J. Herrera (1996), “Wealth Effects of Asset 
Securitization,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, 151-64.  
Meissmer, V. (2001), “Synthetische ABS,” Kreditpraxis, Vol. 26, No. 1, Wiesbaden, 4-7. 
Millon, M. and A. Thakor (1985), “Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial 
Information Gathering Agencies,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 5, 1403-22. 
Myers, S. C. (1984), “The Capital Structure Puzzle,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, 575-92. 
Myers, S. C. (1977), “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 5, 
147-75. 
Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf (1984), “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, 187-
221. 
Office of Thrift Supervision (2003), “Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs and Early 
Amortization Programs,” Transmittal No. TR 331, Department of the Treasury, Federal 
Register, Vol. 68, No. 190, 56568-86 (October) (available at 
http://164.109.25.59/docs/8/86331.pdf). 
Ohl, H.-P. (1994), “Asset-Backed-Securities – Ein Innovatives Instrument zur Finanzierung 
Deutscher Unternehmen,” Schriftenreihe für Kreditwirtschaft und Finanzierung, Vol. 17, 
Wiesbaden. 
Ong, M. K. (1999). Internal Credit Risk Models - Capital Allocation and Performance Measurement. Risk 
Books, London. 
Pearlstein, S. (2004), “Can ‘Old’ Europe Preserve Its Prosperity,” The Washington Post, 6 August, E01. 
Pennacchi, G. G. (1988), “Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, 375-
96. 
Petersen, M. and R. Rajan (1994), “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small 
Business Data,” Journal of Finance 49, 1, 3-37. 
Pfister, B. (2002), “Der Ratingansatz von Moody’s für Europäische CMBS-Anleihen,” Moody’s 
Investor Service, International Structured Finance, Special Report (April). 
Röchling, A. (2002). Loan-Backed Securities - Verbriefung von Firmenkundenkrediten in einem Verbund von 
Kreditinstituten am Beispiel der deutschen Sparkasse. Josef Eul Verlag, Köln. 
Rosenthal, J. and J. Ocampo (1988). Securitisation of Credit. John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Ross, S. A. (1977), “The Determinantion of Financial Structure: the Incentive Signalling Approach,” 
The Bell Journal of Economics, 23-40.    29 
Schierenbeck, H. (2001). Ertragsorientiertes Bankmanagement. Vol. 2: Risiko-Controlling und 
Bilanzstrukturmanagement, Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden. 
Shyam-Sunder, L. and S. C. Myers (1999), “Testing Static Trade-Off Against Pecking Order Models 
of Capital Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 51, 219-44. 
Skarabot, J. (2002), “Securitisation and Special Purpose Vehicle Structures,” Working Paper, Haas 
School of Business, University of California at Berkeley (29 April) (available at 
http://faculty.hass.berkeley.edu/skarabot/unix/ch2.pdf). 
Skora, R. K. (1998), “Rational Modelling of Credit Risk and Credit Derivatives,” Skora & Company, 
Inc., New York. 
Stopp, A. H. (1997), “Asset-Backed Financing in Germany: Legal Concepts Affecting the 
Securitisation of German Receivables,” The Financier, Vol. 4, No. 5 (December), 27-32. 
Stulz, R. and H. Johnson (1985), “An Analysis of Secured Debt,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
14, 501-21.  
Sullivan, D. (1998), “Note: Why Does Tax Law Restrict Short-Term Trading Activity for Asset 
Securitisation,” Virginia Tax Review, Vol. 17, 610-55. 
Telpner, J. (2003), "A Securitisation Primer for First Time Issuers,” Global Securitisation and Structured 
Finance 2003, Greenberg Traurig. (available at 
http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/articles/2003/telpner03a.pdf). 
The Bond Market Association (1998), “An Investor’s Guide to Asset-Backed Securities – Investing 
for Attractive Yield and High Credit Quality,” New York (available at 
http://www.bondmarkets.com). 
Weiss, W. (1999), “Asset-Backed Securities (ABS),” in: Achleitner, A.-K. and G. Thoma (eds.) 
Handbuch Corporate Finance: Konzepte, Strategien und Praxiswissen für das Moderne Finanzmanagement. 
Supplementary edition 4/1999, 1-35. 
Wighton, D. (2005), “Credit Protection: Lightyear Set to Exploit the CDO Market,” Financial Times, 3 
January, 10. 
Zweig, P. L. (2002), “Asset-Backed Securities,” in: D. R. Henderson (ed.). The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics. The Library of Economics and Liberty, Liberty Fund Inc. (available at 
http://www.econlib.org). 
Zweig, P. L. (1989), “The Corporate View,” in: P. L. Zweig (ed.) The Asset Securitization Handbook. 
Dow-Jones Irwin, Homewood, IL. 
 
                                                 
∗ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Center for Financial Research (CFR), 550 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20429, USA; London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Dept. of Finance and 
Accounting and Financial Markets Group (FMG); e-mail: ajobst@fdic.gov. The views expressed in this paper    30 
                                                                                                                                                 
represent those of the author only and do not reflect those of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). 
1 Mr. Lowell L Bryan is Director, Global Strategy Practice, McKinsey & Company Inc., USA (Edwards, 2001). 
2 The principal asset classes of securitised reference portfolios are loans, high-yield bonds, mortgages, credit 
card transactions, licence and franchise operations, lease agreements as well as trade deliverables and services, 
which determine the classification of the securitisation transactions: collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), 
collateralised bond obligations (CBOs), collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs), credit card asset-backed 
securitisation (ABS), student loan ABS or trade receivables asset-backed securitisation ABS. 
3 The securitisation process also broadens the investor base, as the pooling of asset exposures makes the 
securitisation large enough to be efficient – even though securitised assets tend to be fairly illiquid and private 
in nature. 
4 SPVs are best understood as trust-like entities, which are founded solely for the task of securitising the 
reference portfolio of assets. 
5 Synthetic transactions come in various structural arrangements, which can be specified along three major 
dimensions: (i) the level of funding (unfunded, (fully) funded or partially funded); (ii) the involvement of a SPV 
as issuing agent (indirect or direct securitisation); and (iii) the degree of collateralisation of funded elements by 
means of government bonds, third-party guarantees, letter of credit, certificate of indebtedness, Pfandbriefe and 
other acceptable type of collateral). 
6 Originators only transfer credit risk, which allows them to retain customer relationships and servicing 
revenues (Böhringer et al., 2001). See also Zweig (2002 and 1989). 
7 The IMF defines true sale transactions as “the creation of securities from a pool of pre-existing assets and 
receivables that are placed under the legal control of investors through a special intermediary created for this 
purpose.” (IMF, 2004). 
8 For simplicity we assume that the issuer re-invests the maximum proceeds from the securitisation (nominal 
value of the reference portfolio minus expected loss and structuring cost) at the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC), so claimholder rights of debt and equity remain unaffected by use of funds from securitised 
debt. This approach also implies no change in the balance sheet volume if we rule out negative net present 
value reinvestment of proceeds. 
9 Note here that this WACC-based balance sheet approach is taken from the perspective of the asset originator, 
whose total assets are assumed to be securitised. In other words, we only analyse the relative balance sheet 
effect of increased leverage over a defined set of securitised asset exposures of the same asset return and 
marginal cost of debt. 
10 See also Basle Committee (2002a, 2002b and 2001). 
11 Adapted from Bluhm (2003). See also Schierenbeck (2001) and Ong (1999). 
12 See Skarabot (2002), Leland (1998), Frankel (1991) as well as Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) for an economic 
analysis of this risk transfer property of securitisation.  
13 Investment risk arises if both cash inflows and cash outflows are fixed interest payments but differ in maturity 
(“maturity mismatch”). In contrast, base risk arises from a mismatch of cash inflows and cash outflows as 
floating interest payments on different interest reference rates. Term structure risk refers to an insufficient 
immunisation against interest rate movements if cash inflows are fixed (floating) interest payments and cash 
outflows are floating (fixed) interest payments. 
14 Note that the distinction of issuer and asset originator reflects the fact that asset originator and issuer are the 
same entity in synthetic structures without SPV. The involvement of a SPV in the transaction structure limits 
our comments on major incentive problems to the asset originator only. 
15 See also Leland (1998). See also Leland and Pyle (1977) for a reference on the agency cost of asymmetric 
information in external finance. 
16 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2002b) defines credit enhancement as a contractual 
arrangement [,] in which the bank retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some 
degree of added protection to other parties to the transaction. [...].” See also Jobst (2004). 
17 See also Pfister (2002), Gluck and Remeza (2000), Falcone and Gluck (1998), Howard and Merritt (1997), 
Becker and Speaks (1996) as well as Cumming (1987). 
18 However, as opposed to DeMarzo and Duffie (1997), who interpret the retention of the most junior claim in 
a transaction as a costly signal in the spirit of Leyland and Pyle (1977), credit enhancement does not constitute a 
signalling device, as it fails to increase transparency. Only in combination with remedial measures against ex ante 
moral hazard (such as optimal tranching) can issuers ward off the risk of possible adverse selection à la Akerlof 
(1970).     31 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 The “capitalisation” of the financial system at hand arguably signals the importance of market transparency 
in external finance. 
20 The sponsoring bank typically provides liquidity and credit enhancements to the ABCP programme, which 
aid the program in obtaining high quality credit ratings (Office of Thrift Supervision, 2003). 
21 SME conduits traditionally accept only large SME receivables of at least €50 million (U.S.$60 million) into 
ABCP programmes. However, over the last three years some arrangers of ABCP have begun to specialise in 
small-sized deals, which involve more than 10 creditors and a minimum value of individual asset claims of at 
least €5 million (U.S.$6 million). 
22 In this case financial institutions merely act as underwriters. Note here many large corporations have 
established own securitisation platforms (e.g. General Electric, Siemens). Whole business and project loan ABS 
transactions of SMEs are hardly observed but in the U.K. 
23 See also Bund (2000a and 2000b), Herrmann and Tierney (1999), Eck (1998), Kohler (1998), Stopp (1997), 
Ohl (1994). 
24 According to the Institut for Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) in Bonn, more than 3.3 million SMEs represent 99.5% 
of all registered enterprises in Germany. German SMEs employ more than 70% of the total workforce and 
generate almost 60% of GDP (DSGV, 2004). See also Albach (1983) for a general description of the German 
Mittelstand and its pivotal economic role. 
25 “On-lending” of residential mortgages by government agencies could be compared to mortgage funding by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae or collateralised bank advances for mortgages by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank in the U.S. In the case of Germany government agencies, such as the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), 
would provide funding to SMEs via commercial banks as underwriters, who retain full liability for the 
repayment of principal and interest. 
26 The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), jointly owned by the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
states, is one of the development agencies, commissioned by the German government to ease the financing 
costs for SMEs and private homeowners as well as to promote export and project finance in Germany and 
developing countries abroad. 
27 The CORE 1998-1 transaction securitised the cash flow proceeds from DM-denominated loans to over 
5,000 German SMEs (and a small selection U.S.$-denominated bonds) at a total notional value of DM4.26 
billion (€2.17 billion, U.S.$2.6 billion). This ground-breaking deal did not only win critical acclaim for kick-
starting the European CLO/CBO market, which has developed into the fastest growing sector of European 
asset-backed securities. It was also the first securitisation of German SME loans and the most highly diverse 
CLO portfolio to come to global capital markets. At that time, Deutsche Bank AG estimated its overall share 
in total lending to German SMEs to amount to 5.3% of a total market volume of €58 billion (U.S.$70 billion) 
in the first half of 1999 (Deutsche Bank, 1999). 
28 The complete range of statutory tasks of KfW include the promotion of SMEs, home finance or housing 
modernisation, the protection of the environment and the climate, export and project finance and the 
promotion of the developing and transition countries. 
29 Although both agency-sponsored SME and RMBS securitisation platforms have already established an 
impressive four-year track record, the “German share” in European securitisation of 3.4% of €207 billion 
(U.S.$248 billion) in 2003 (Source: Thomson Financial) is still found wanting; yet, the German on-balance sheet 
equivalent to off-balance sheet ABS structures, the Pfandbrief, claimed a respectable 81.5% of €219 billion 
(U.S.$263 billion) outstanding volume in 2003 (Source: Dealogic Bondware).  
30 The exact definition of SMEs as a mostly privately owned, niche market operators varies by country. For 
instance, according to the Institut for Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) in Germany SMEs are classified by annual 
turnover (≤€1 million [small size enterprise] and ≤€50 million [medium size enterprise]) or by the number of 
employees (≤9 employees [small size enterprise] and ≤499 [medium size enterprise]). A revised classification by 
the European Union in May 2003 raises the threshold values of annual turnover and introduces balance sheet 
volume as a third measure: (i) annual turnover (≤€2 million [micro size enterprise], ≤€10 million [small size 
enterprise]  and ≤€50 million [medium size enterprise]), (ii) balance sheet volume (≤€2 million [micro size 
enterprise], ≤€10m [small size enterprise] and ≤€43 million [medium size enterprise]), and (iii) number of 
employees (<10 employees [micro size enterprise], <50 employees [small size enterprise] and <250 employees 
[medium size enterprise]). 
31 See also Eichholz (2000). 
32 After the Circular 4/97 by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), the October 2002 
Guideline by the German Institute of Accountants (IDW) laid the groundwork for the legal and accounting 
treatment of asset securitisation in Germany, the continued trade tax liability (“withholding tax”) of    32 
                                                                                                                                                 
bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicles has practically rendered true sale securitisation meaningless. See 
also Bernard et al. (2003). 
33 On 9 July 2003, Bayerische Landesbank, Citigroup, Commerzbank, DekaBank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank, DZ BANK, Eurohypo, HSH Nordbank, HVB Group, KfW Group, Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen and 
WestLB AG signed a Letter of Intent to define the business model for a securitisation platform to facilitate 
traditional (true sale) transaction structures in Germany (KfW Group, 2003). 
34 See also Meissmer (2001). 